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Abstract Recently, a quantum multi-party summation protocol based on the1
quantum Fourier transform has been proposed [Quantum Inf Process 17: 129,2
2018]. The protocol claims to be secure against both outside and participant3
attacks. However, a closer look reveals that the player in charge of generating4
the required multi-partite entangled states can launch two kinds of attacks to5
learn about other parties’ private integer strings without being caught. In this6
paper, we present these attacks, and propose countermeasures to make the7
protocol secure again. The improved protocol not only can resist these attacks8
but also remove the need for the quantum Fourier transform and encoding9
quantum operations by participants.10
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1 Introduction
Since the advent of quantum key distribution (QKD) by Bennett and Brassard
[1], a variety of other secure quantum communication protocols has emerged.
This includes novel techniques for quantum secure direct communication [2],
quantum secret sharing [3], secure multi-party quantum computation [4,5,6,7,
8], remote state preparation [9,10], which will be part of the growing number
of applications that can be run on quantum networks [11,12]. Of particular
interest is the secure multi-party quantum summation [13,14,15,16], as a fun-
damental primitive for secure multi-party quantum computation [4,5,6,7,8],
whose goals are the protection of participants’ input privacy and the guar-
antee of the correctness of the summation result. Quantum summation has
potential applications in quantum anonymous ranking [17], quantum private
comparison [18], and quantum anonymous voting [19]. Ji et al. [20] have dis-
cussed how to implement these applications by using quantum summation
protocols. A considerable number of quantum summation protocols have thus
been proposed by using various quantum states, including single photons in
two degrees of freedom [21], Bell states [22,23], Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger
(GHZ) states [24], genuinely maximally entangled six-qubit states [25], and
multi-partite high-dimensional entangled states [16,20,26,27,28].
Lately, Yang et al. [28] have proposed a quantum summation protocol,
which we refer to by YY2018’s protocol, hereafter, based on the quantum
Fourier transform. It has been claimed that YY2018’s protocol is secure against
outside and participant attacks. In this work, we show that, although P1, who
prepares the d-level n-component entangled states, cannot collude with other
dishonest participants, she can launch attacks to learn about other partici-
pants’ private integer strings without being detected. We present two kinds
of such attacks and propose an improved protocol that renders these attacks
invalid. In addition, our new protocol removes the requirement for the quan-
tum Fourier transform and encoding quantum operations to be performed by
participants [28].
Note that Shi et al. [26] also proposed a quantum summation protocol
earlier based on the quantum Fourier transform. However, Shi et al.’s and
YY2018’s protocols are quite different. Shi et al. protocol adopts the circle-type
transmission mode while YY2018’s protocol adopts the tree-type transmission
mode [28]. In addition, Shi et al. employ controlled NOT (CNOT) gates and
oracle operators, which are not required in Yang et al.’s work. In Shi et al.’s
protocol I, as the authors mention, even though the initiators private input
(P1’s private input) is unconditionally secure against other dishonest parties,
the dishonest parties Pk−1 and Pk+1 (k 6= 1) can collaborate to steal Pk’s
private input. To overcome this weakness, they design their improved protocol
III in their paper, which is secure against the collusive attacks from any less
than n− 1 dishonest parties.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review
YY2018’s protocol and give a brief analysis of its security. In Section 3, we
present in detail the two attacks that can be attempted by the first player, P1.
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In Section 4, we discuss how to detect P1’s attacks and propose an improved
protocol, followed by its correctness and security analysis. Conclusions are
given in Section 5.
2 The YY2018’s protocol
Let us begin with a review of YY2018’s protocol [28]. In their protocol, P1
is assumed not to conspire with other participants and the quantum channels
are assumed to be ideal without any noise.
In a group of n players, suppose player Pi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n and n > 2, has a
private integer string Ki of length N in the following form.
Ki =
(
k1i , k
2
i , . . . , k
N
i
)
, (1)
where kti ∈ {0, 1, . . . , d−1}, for t = 1, 2, . . . , N . P1, P2, . . . , Pn intend to jointly
compute the summation of their private integer strings, K, given by
K = K1 ⊕K2 ⊕ . . .⊕Kn
=
(
k11 ⊕ k12 ⊕ . . .⊕ k1n, k21 ⊕ k22 ⊕ . . .⊕ k2n, . . . ,⊕kN1 ⊕ kN2 ⊕ . . .⊕ kNn
)
,
(2)
where ⊕ denotes addition modulo d.
YY2018’s protocol can be described as follows.
(Step 1) P1 prepares N d-level n-component entangled states, each of which is in
the state 1√
d
∑d−1
r=0 |r〉1 |r〉2 . . . |r〉n, and then arranges them into an ordered
sequence[
1√
d
d−1∑
r=0
|r〉11|r〉12 . . . |r〉1n,
1√
d
d−1∑
r=0
|r〉21|r〉22 . . . |r〉2n, . . . ,
1√
d
d−1∑
r=0
|r〉N1 |r〉N2 . . . |r〉Nn
]
,
(3)
where the superscripts 1, 2, . . . , N present the order of d-level n-component
entangled states in the sequence. Later, P1 picks up the i-th, i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
component from each state to construct n sequences labelled as:
S1 =
(
p11, p
2
1, . . . , p
N
1
)
,
S2 =
(
p12, p
2
2, . . . , p
N
2
)
,
...
Sn =
(
p1n, p
2
n, . . . , p
N
n
)
,
(4)
where pti, t = 1, 2, . . . , N , denotes the i-th component of the t-th entangled
state. Next, P1 prepares n− 1 groups of decoy photons and each photon is
randomly chosen from {|r〉}d−1r=0 , i.e., the computational basis, or {F |r〉}d−1r=0 ,
i.e., the Fourier basis, where F is the d-th order discrete quantum Fourier
transform. P1 randomly selects one group of the decoy photons and ran-
domly inserts them into Sj , j = 2, 3, . . . , n, to form a new sequence S
′
j . At
last, P1 keeps S1 in her hand and sends S
′
j to Pj .
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(Step 2) In this step, P1 uses the decoy photons to check if the transmission of
S′j, j = 2, 3, . . . , n, is secure with Pj . If the error rate is higher than a
predetermined threshold, they will terminate the protocol; otherwise, they
will proceed to the next step.
(Step 3) Pj , j = 2, 3, . . . , n, discards the decoy photons in S
′
j and obtain Sj . Pj ,
j = 1, 2, . . . , n, encodes her private integer string Kj on the components
in Sj by performing Ukt
j
F , t = 1, 2, . . . , N , on component ptj , where Uktj =∑d−1
u=0 |u ⊕ ktj〉〈u| and ⊕ represents addition modulo d. The new sequence
of Sj after encoding is denoted by ESj . P1 also encodes her private integer
string K1 on the components in S1 by performing Ukt
1
F on component pt1.
The new sequence of S1 after encoded is denoted by ES1.
(Step 4) After all parties have finished encoding their private integer strings, each
of them measures all components in their hand in the computational basis
{|r〉}d−1r=0 and obtains the corresponding measurement results as follows
M1 =
(
m11,m
2
1, . . . ,m
N
1
)
,
M2 =
(
m12,m
2
2, . . . ,m
N
2
)
,
...
Mn =
(
m1n,m
2
n, . . . ,m
N
n
)
,
(5)
where mti, with i = 1, 2, . . . , n and t = 1, 2, . . . , N , is the measurement
result of component pti after encoding. Pi, i = 2, 3, . . . , n, then announces
Mi to P1. Finally, P1 obtains the summation of all parties’ private integer
strings by computing M1 ⊕M2 ⊕ . . .⊕Mn, which she can then announce.
A quantum summation protocol should be secure against outside as well
as participant attacks. In the YY2018’s protocol, resilience against outside at-
tacks is achieved by using decoy photons [29,30], which ensure that the quan-
tum transmission between P1 and other parties is secure. We find, however,
that YY2018’s protocol is not necessarily secure against participant attacks.
In particular, P1 has a chance to carry out effective attacks to achieve other
participants’ private inputs. Furthermore, we can see that all parties use UkF
to encode their private integer strings. This is equivalent to the measurement
in the Fourier basis and the addition modulo d of their measurement results
and private integer strings. As a result, the quantum operation UkF can be
replaced with the measurement in the Fourier basis and the simple addition
modulo d operation. We describe these points in the following sections.
3 P1’s attacks
In this section, we show how P1 can initiate attacks to obtain other parties’
private integer strings without being detected. As we mentioned in Section 2,
YY2018’s protocol in its current form is only able to detect the outside attacks,
which makes P1’s attacks possible due to her advantage over other parties. P1
is able to perform different quantum operations on the states she has prepared,
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although she cannot conspire with other parties. Here, we describe two kinds
of such attacks that enables P1 to steal other parties’ private integer strings.
3.1 Attack 1
(1) P1 prepares N d-level n-component entangled states, with each of them
being in the state 1√
d
∑d−1
r=0 |r〉1|r〉2 . . . |r〉n, and arranges them into an
ordered sequence as in equation (3). She then measures each component in
the basis {|r〉}d−1r=0 . The collapsed states after measurement become[(|r1〉
1
, |r1〉
2
, . . . , |r1〉n),
(|r2〉
1
, |r2〉2, . . . , |r2〉n), . . . ,
(|rN〉
1
, |rN 〉2, . . . , |rN 〉n)],
(6)
where |rt〉i, with rt ∈ {0, 1, . . . , d− 1}, t = 1, 2, . . . , N , and i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
denotes the collapsed state of the i-th component in the t-th d-level n-
component entangled state after measurement. After that, P1 performs F
†
on each component in the sequence, which results in the following states
[
(F †|r1〉1, F †|r1
〉
2
, . . . , F †|r1〉n),
(
F †|r2〉
1
, F †|r2〉2, . . . , F †|r2〉n),
. . . ,
(
F †|rN〉
1
, F †|rN 〉2, . . . , F †|rN 〉n)], (7)
where F is the quantum Fourier transform and F †F = FF † = I.
Later, P1 rearranges the n sequences in the following way:
S1 =
(
F †|r1〉
1
, F †|r2〉1, . . . , F †|rN 〉1),
S2 =
(
F †|r1〉
2
, F †|r2〉2, . . . , F †|rN 〉2),
...
Sn =
(
F †|r1〉
n
, F †|r2〉n, . . . , F †|rN 〉n).
(8)
P1 then sends Sj , j = 2, 3, . . . , n, to Pj using the decoy-photon technique.
(2) After confirming that Sj , j = 2, 3, . . . , n, has been securely received by Pj ,
Pj performs Ukt
j
F on component F †|rt〉j , t = 1, 2, . . . , N , as in (Step 3) of
the protocol. The corresponding encoded state becomes
(Ukt
j
F )F †|rt〉j = Ukt
j
FF †|rt〉j = Ukt
j
|rt〉j = |ktj ⊕ rt〉j . (9)
Next, Pj measures all components in the basis {|r〉}d−1r=0 , and her measure-
ment results will be
Mj =
(
m1j ,m
2
j , . . . ,m
N
j
)
, (10)
wheremtj = r
t⊕ktj . Pj then announcesMj to P1 in (Step 4) of the protocol.
Clearly, P1 can easily extract k
t
j from m
t
j because she knows r
t exactly. P1
can therefore obtain other parties’ private integer strings without being
caught.
6 Cai Zhang et al.
3.2 Attack 2
In Attack 2, we consider, for simplicity, how P1 can steal one integer of one
party’s (say Pj ’s, j 6= 1) private integer string.
(1) P1 prepares one d-level n-component entangled state, in the state
1√
d
∑d−1
r=0
|r〉1|r〉2 . . . |r〉n, and then performs the quantum Fourier transform on each
of the last n− 1 components. The resulting state is given by
1√
d
d−1∑
r=0
|r〉1F |r〉2 . . . F |r〉n. (11)
She then sends the first component of the above state to Pj using the decoy
photon technique and holds the remaining n− 1 components in her hand.
(2) After Pj performs UkjF (assume that one integer of her private integer
string is kj) on the received components, the state turns into
1√
d
d−1∑
r=0
UkjF |r〉1F |r〉2 . . . F |r〉n
= d−
n−1
2
∑
l1⊕l2⊕...⊕ln=0
|l1 ⊕ kj〉 ⊗ |l2〉 ⊗ . . .⊗ |ln〉,
(12)
where ⊕ denotes addition modulo d.
Once Pj measures her components and P1 measures the remaining (n− 1)
ones in the basis {|r〉}d−1r=0 , the measurement result will be
|l1 ⊕ kj〉 ⊗ |l2〉 ⊗ . . .⊗ |ln〉. (13)
Next, Pj announces |l1 ⊕ kj〉 to P1. In the end, P1 can achieve kj by
computing
l1 ⊕ kj ⊕ l2 ⊕ . . .⊕ ln
= kj ⊕ l1 ⊕ l2 ⊕ . . .⊕ ln = kj . (14)
Because the original n sequences are constructed by P1, she could also adopt
a similar method for obtaining other parties’ private integer strings without
being caught.
Note that, in Attack 2, stealing one integer of each party’s private integer
string costs one d-level n-component entangled state. In order to take all other
parties’ private strings, N(n− 1) such entangled states are required, which is
more expensive compared with Attack 1 where only N such entangled states
are needed. Similarly, P1 can employ other entangled states, such as d-level
Bell states and d-level GHZ states, to get other parties’ private integer strings.
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4 The improved protocol
In the previous section, we showed how P1 could succeed in obtaining other
parties’ private integer strings without being caught. This is mainly because
of the lack of a detection mechanism, in YY2018’s protocol, to check if the
N states shared among n parties are genuinely d-level n-component entangled
states in the form of 1√
d
∑d−1
r=0 |r〉1|r〉2 . . . |r〉n. One solution would then be to
add a detection step to the protocol before other parties encode their private
integer strings on the components sent by P1.
Before presenting our method for detecting a dishonest P1, let us explore
some of the properties of the main states used in YY2018’s protocol. Let
r ∈ {0, 1, . . . , d−1} and d ≥ 2. The set {|r〉}d−1r=0 forms a d-level computational
basis. The d-th order quantum Fourier transform is defined as
F |r〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
l=0
ζlr|l〉, (15)
where ζ = e2pii/d and the set {F |r〉}d−1r=0 is a d-level Fourier basis. Expanding
each |r〉, r = 0, 1, . . . , d− 1, in the Fourier basis gives
|r〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
l=0
ζ−lrF |l〉. (16)
The d-level n-component entangled state, |ω〉12...n = 1√d
∑d−1
r=0 |r〉1|r〉2 . . . |r〉n,
can then be rewritten as
|ω〉12...n
=
1√
d
d−1∑
r=0
|r〉1|r〉2 . . . |r〉n
=
1√
d
d−1∑
r=0
(
1√
d
d−1∑
l1=0
ζ−l1rF |l1〉1)( 1√
d
d−1∑
l2=0
ζ−l2rF |l2〉2) . . . ( 1√
d
d−1∑
ln=0
ζ−lnrF |ln〉n)
= (
1√
d
)n+1
d−1∑
r=0
∑
l1,l2,...,ln
ζ−r(l1+l2+...+ln)F |l1〉1F |l2〉2 . . . F |ln〉n)
= (
1√
d
)n−1
∑
l1⊕l2⊕...⊕ln=0
F |l1〉1F |l2〉2 . . . F |ln〉n). (17)
The above state has an interesting property. If each component of |ω〉12...n is
measured in the d-level computational basis, then all the measurement results
would be the same as, i.e., all subsystems will be in state |r〉, for a single r ∈
{0, 1, . . . , d−1}. If each component of |ω〉12...n is measured in the d-level Fourier
basis, however, then the outcome would be in the form F |l1〉1F |l2〉2 . . . F |ln〉n,
where l1⊕ l2⊕ . . .⊕ ln = 0. We can, therefore, employ this property of |ω〉12...n
to check if it is shared properly among n parties.
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We are now ready to explain our improved protocol, whose assumptions
are the same as that of YY2018’s protocol. The improved protocol is described
in the following.
(S 1) P1 preparesN+q d-level n-component entangled sates, with q being a secu-
rity parameter, each of which is in the state |ω〉12...n. She then chooses the
i-th, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, component from each state to construct the following
n sequences:
S1 =
(
p11, p
2
1, . . . , p
N+q
1
)
,
S2 =
(
p12, p
2
2, . . . , p
N+q
2
)
,
...
Sn =
(
p1n, p
2
n, . . . , p
N+q
n
)
,
(18)
where pti, i = 1, 2, . . . , n and t = 1, 2, . . . , N + q, represents the i-th compo-
nent of the t-th entangled state |ω〉12...n. Afterward, P1 randomly inserts
decoy photons into Sj , j = 2, 3, . . . , n, to form a new sequence, denoted by
S′j. Finally, P1 sends S
′
j to Pj and keeps S1 in her hand.
(S 2) Similarly to the (Step 2) of YY2018’s protocol, once Pj (j = 2, 3, . . . , n)
confirms that she has received S′j , Pj and P1 utilize the decoy photons to
check if the transmission of S′j is secure. If the error rate is greater than a
predetermined threshold, they will terminate the protocol; otherwise, they
will proceed to the next step.
(S 3) In this step, Pj , j = 2, 3, . . . , n, will check if entangled states |ω〉12...n
are genuinely shared among n parties. By removing the decoy photons
from S′j , Pj obtains Sj . Next, P2, P3, . . . , Pn agree to randomly choose q
entangled states |ω〉′12...n from S1, S2, . . . , Sn. For each of the chosen states,
they randomly ask P1 to measure her component in the computational
basis or in the Fourier basis and to announce her measurement result.
Other parties also measure their corresponding components in the same
basis as P1 did. The measurement results, according to equation (17), are
correlated if all components come from the same entangled state |ω〉12...n
and are measured in the same basis. They compute the error rate relying on
these measurement results. If the error rate is higher than a predetermined
threshold, they will terminate the protocol; otherwise, they will proceed to
the next step.
(S 4) By removing q entangled states used for detection, all parties share, with a
high probability, N genuine d-level n-component entangled states |ω〉12...n.
All parties measure all the components in their hand in the Fourier basis
and get certain measurement results. By mapping F |r〉, as the output mea-
surement state, to the integer r, for r = 0, 1, . . . , d− 1, Pj (j = 1, 2, . . . , n)
will obtain an integer string Lj = (l
1
j , l
2
j , . . . , l
N
j ), with l
t
j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , d−1}
and t = 1, 2, . . . , N . After that, Pj , j = 2, 3, . . . , n, computes Mj =
Kj ⊕ Lj = (k1j ⊕ l1j , k2j ⊕ l2j , . . . , kNj ⊕ lNj ), and sends it to P1. P1 also
computes M1 = K1⊕L1. Because lt1⊕ lt2⊕ . . .⊕ ltn = 0, in accordance with
equation (17), P1 can eventually achieve the summation of parties’ private
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integer strings by the following computation
M1 ⊕M2 ⊕ . . .⊕Mn
=

⊕ n∑
j=1
k1j ⊕ l1j ,
⊕ n∑
j=1
k2j ⊕ l2j , . . . ,
⊕ n∑
j=1
kNj ⊕ lNj


=

⊕ n∑
j=1
k1j ⊕
⊕ n∑
j=1
l1j ,
⊕ n∑
j=1
k2j ⊕
⊕ n∑
j=1
l2j , . . . ,
⊕ n∑
j=1
kNj ⊕
⊕ n∑
j=1
lNj


=

⊕ n∑
j=1
k1j ,
⊕ n∑
j=1
k2j , . . . ,
⊕ n∑
j=1
kNj


= K1 ⊕K2 ⊕ . . .⊕Kn = K,
(19)
where
⊕∑n
i xi = x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ . . .⊕ xn. P1 then announces the result.
4.1 Analysis
Let us move on to the analyses of our improved protocol’s correctness and
security.
We first analyze the correctness. Note that we also utilize d-level n-component
entangled states |ω〉12...n to design the improved protocol and that the state
F |r〉 corresponds to the integer r, for r = 0, 1, . . . , d − 1. For each entan-
gled state used for the summation of all parties’ private integer strings, Pj ,
j = 1, 2, . . . , n, measures her component in the Fourier basis; if Pj obtains
the measurement result F |ltj〉, t = 1, 2, . . . , N , she will get the corresponding
integer ltj that has the relation l
t
1 ⊕ lt2 ⊕ . . . ⊕ ltn = 0 according to equation
(17). Thus, after receiving Mj = Kj ⊕ Lj = (k1j ⊕ l1j , k2j ⊕ l2j , . . . , kNj ⊕ lNj ),
j = 2, 3, . . . , n, sent by Pj , P1 can eventually obtain the correct result, as
shown in equation (19).
For the security, because we also employ decoy photon technique to detect
outside attacks, the improved protocol is still secure against all kinds of outside
attacks. It also remains secure against attacks from n − 2 dishonest parties
(excluding P1 because she cannot conspire with any dishonest party). Suppose
they want to steal P1’s and Pi’s private integer strings, they have to learn
about the exact values of lt1 and l
t
i, t = 1, 2, . . . , N , that are used to encrypt
P1’s and Pi’s private integer strings, respectively. This, however, is impossible,
because lt1 and l
t
i are only known to P1 and Pi, respectively. Consequently, the
(n− 2)-party collusive attack would not be effective in the improved protocol.
We focus now on P1’s attacks. As we can see from equation (17), if the
genuine entangled state |ω〉12...n is shared in the same way as proposed in
the improved protocol, P1 is unable to attain other parties’ private integer
strings since she does not know the exact values of lti , i = 2, 3, . . . , n and
t = 1, 2, . . . , N . She will try to construct special quantum states to steal other
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parties’ secret, as presented in Section 3. However, if P1 launches such attacks,
she will be caught in Step (S 3) of the improved protocol, as the correlations
will be destroyed, according to equation (17).
Suppose that P1 makes the similar Attack 1 to obtain some parties’ private
integer strings, she may prepare fake states as
(F |r〉1, F |r〉2, . . . , F |r〉n), (20)
where r ∈ {0, 1, . . . , d−1}. In order to pass the detection with high probability
in Step (S 3) of the improved protocol, P1 has to prepare the fake states as
few as possible.
Let us consider the case where P1 only wishes to attain one integer of
each party’s integer string. She can then prepare only one fake quantum state
(F |r〉1, F |r〉2, . . . , F |r〉n) and N + q − 1 genuine entangled states |ω〉12...n. In
this case, P1 has the maximum possibility of passing the detection.
The probability of P1 not being detected by our proposed mechanism can
be calculated as follows. Note that the fake quantum state should not be
chosen for detection so that P1 can succeed in obtaining one integer of each
party’s integer string. Since P2, P3, . . . , Pn randomly choose q entangled states
for detection, the probability that P1 passes the detection and gets the private
integer is (
N + q − 1
q
)
/
(
N + q
q
)
=
N
N + q
, (21)
which will approach to 0 when q is sufficiently large.
If the fake quantum state is chosen for detection, P1 could still pass the
detection with probability (12 +
1
2d ). However, she cannot obtain any informa-
tion about other parties’ private integer strings, as she shares |ω〉12...n among
all the parties and the measurement results of other parties are unknown to
her. The analysis of the attacks based on fake entangled states (Attack 2) is
similar. These two kinds of attacks thus become ineffective in the improved
protocol.
In fact, once the genuine entangled state |ω〉12...n is shared among n parties,
it would be impossible for any group of less than n−1 parties (including P1) to
obtain the remaining two parties’ private inputs as their private keys cannot
be exactly obtained. Note that in the improved protocol, there is no need for
parties to encode their private integer strings. That has been replaced with
the measurement in the Fourier basis and classical addition modulo d.
We would like to point out that two months after submission of this
manuscript, a similar work, by Gu and Hwang, appeared on arXiv [32]. Let
us compare Gu and Hwang’s work with our work in terms of the attacks, the
detection methods, and the improved protocols. In terms of attacks, Gu and
Hwang’s only attack is almost the same as our Attack 1. The only difference
is in Step 1. If P1 in our protocol can also initially prepare n single d-level
states, with each of which from the basis {F |0〉, F |1〉, . . . , F |d − 1〉}, instead
of an n-component entangled state, then these two attacks are the same. In
our case, we also present another attack, Attack 2, based on entangled states,
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which is not discussed in Gu and Hwang’s work. To solve the security prob-
lem, Gu and Hwang’s work and our work both use the same method to check
if the initial state |ω〉1,2,...,n is correctly shared among participants. For the
improved protocols, Gu and Hwang’s and Yang et al.’s are the same except for
the step added to detect P1’s dishonesty. In our work, we changed YY2018’s
protocol a bit more. In our improved protocol, in addition to the new step for
P1’s dishonesty detection, we also remove the need for the quantum Fourier
transform and encoding quantum operations by participants. Instead, noting
that the operation UkF to encode private integer strings is equivalent to the
measurements in the Fourier basis followed by addition modulo d of the mea-
surement results, we offer a simpler technique to implement the protocol.
5 Conclusions
We showed that the protocol in [28] could not prevent P1, who prepares d-level
n-component entangled states, from obtaining other parties’ private integer
strings. We analyzed in detail P1’s two kinds of attacks and proposed an im-
proved protocol that rectified such security threats. In addition, our improved
protocol did not require quantum operations to encode parties’ private integer
strings.
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